The Fourth Wave of Newly Independent States

[Note: This is in part a reply to Miodrag Kapor’s earlier post on Kosovo, but due to its length, I have decided to make it a separate post rather than a comment.]

You are right to worry about the cascade effect of Kosovo’s independence. As we have discussed previously, I believe the province’s independence is a fait accompli and cannot be avoided at this point. While some commentators have said Russia will block it out of ideology and not use it a bargaining chit, I disagree. I have watched the Putin administration closely for almost a decade and have yet to see ideology rear its ugly head. He is a pragmatism to the core and will ultimately sell out the Serbs (an outcome which, I believe, would be in the nation's long-term interests) to get his way with Abkhazia (though I still not see an independent South Ossetia in the cards).

Given this, I believe that the international community needs to begin addressing the implications of the “fourth wave” of newly independent states within and on the borders of the European Union. The first and most important wave (1918-1922) resulted from the breakup of the Romanov, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Hohenzollern empires after the Great War, creating Cazecholovakia & the Baltics and reviving Poland and Albania. While the second wave (1945-1969) which was associated with decolonization did little to redraw borders in Europe, the loss of colonial possessions did much to change the face of the Continent. The third wave (1989-1993) again remade the map of Eastern Europe, as the federal states of Yugoslavia and the USSR disintegrated. Today, we sit in the liminal space between waves three and four. In addition to Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Flanders, Wallonia, Euskadi (Basque Country), Catalunya, Padania, Corsica, and various ethno-republics of the Russian Federation are clamoring for absolute autonomy or outright independence. The devolution of power to regional and ethnic areas which the EU has facilitated over the years is a powerful catalyst for these polities. Kosovo’s independence will encourage them even more.

Inside the European Union (especially within the Euro- and Schengen-zones), granting independence is a bureaucratic nightmare, but will have little effect on peace and stability. Outside its borders, things are much stickier—especially where Russian troops might have a say in territorial transfers. Regardless, the lawless statelets which have proliferated since 1989 are a major problem and must be addressed soon. Forcing breakaway republics to adopt parts of the acquis communautaire could possibly function as tool to reduce crime, trafficking, etc. However, to get to that point, the EU needs a policy. In post-Soviet space, it will be Russia that rewards and punishes behavior, and so the Kremlin will need to do its part as well. The question is: how comfortable is the international community with the fracturing of the current state system? Is a 300-member UN anathema or could it be accommodated?

A unified position is the only way forward. Back in the early 1990s, Bush the Elder told Croatia and Slovenia not to jump ship, but there were back channel signals which contradicted this official position, and, of course, the Germans did not hide their feelings about Croatian and Slovene independence. Currently, such mixed messages again proliferate. As Miodrag pointed out in his earlier post, a common EU position on Kosovo itself is almost unimaginable, much less a concerted agreement on the general trend towards splinter states. This situation is likely to emerge as an important shibboleth in years to come. Angela Merkel has shown an amazing propensity for ostrich-like behavior on tough issues, so don’t look to Germany to provide answers. I suspect it instead be Nicholas Sarkozy that decides the future of the European map.

New PM for Russia, But Does It Matter?

An unexpected shake-up within the Russian government has the wonks all atwitter. The media have prematurely crowned a man whose name they don't even utter as the next Russian president. But does it really matter?

Today, Vladimir Putin accepted the resignation of the Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and nominated the hitherto low-profile Leningrader Victor Zubkov to fill the spot. It seems like 1999 all over again when Putin himself emerged from the shadows to become the heir-apparent to Boris Yeltsin, the first democratically-elected president of the second Russian republic. However, something is different here. Yeltsin was ill, unpopular, tired, and beaten. Putin is hale (judo-chop!), adored (in the words of Borat, "Like Stalin!"), invigorated (by America's Iraqi morass), and indefatigable (maybe because he's a teetotaler). In other words, he's not going anywhere. Yes, yes--we all know Putin is stepping down at the end of his second term to make way for a new Russian president--ostensibly Zubkov. However, Putin only promised to step down from the presidency. Unlike Mr. Bush who is already salivating about "replenishing the ol' coffers" after leaving office and whose administration is on auto-pilot, Putin is stepping up the political stakes and bringing his "A-game."

As Hans and Franz used to say--or was it Gov. Schwarzenegger--"hear me now and listen to me later:" Putin is going to Ukrainianize the Russian political system at the last minute by making the head of government more powerful than the head of state. However, unlike Ukraine where a Westernizing president was hamstrung by a pro-Russian PM, Putin will find nothing by pliant (if not supine) acquiescence to his electoral legerdemain. Using that tried-and-true Russian system known as "government-by-telephone," Putin will emasculate the office of the presidency in his final hours in office by transferring power to the office of Prime Minister. But before that, he will then utilize Russia's spectral political party structure to ensure his party-of-the-month (name suggestions for the upcoming election: Russia Rocks and You Suck! and Putin or Die) wins election thus enabling him to be appointed PM at his leisure. Voila, the master of political prestidigitation (see my chapter in George Kassimeris' Playing Politics with Terrorism) will have done it again. All legal and keeping with letter if not spirit of his previous declarations.

Now the bigger picture. Is this good or bad for Russia? Definitely good. Russians can expect better healthcare, a more reliable economic system, and certainly more respect internationally than was the case during the chaotic Yeltsin era. Is it good for the rest of us? If you are Polish, Latvian, or Georgian, then a chill is probably going through your spine right now. But what about the Chinese, Indians, Western Europeans, and Americans? The forecast is mixed.

As a PM with more power than Blair could have ever dreamed, Putin will undoubtedly continue to make Russia stronger. A strong Russia is not only desirable, it is a must for the security of Eurasia. But there is a price to pay, and we've already seen the preview: petro-politics where the losers freeze to death; American college students unable to leave Russia because they bought some Soviet baubles from a babushka; long-range Russian bomber flights in the Atlantic and Pacific; the "father of all bombs" tested publicly yesterday; etc.

With these tidbits in mind, we all need to start preparing ourselves for Putin version 2.o.